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RETAIL CLERKS' UNION

[Sac. No. 6938.

v.

In Bank.

SUl'ERIOR C-OURT

l52

C.~d

May 19, 1959.]

RETAIL CLERKS' UNION, LOCAL NO. 1364, AFL-CIO
(an Unincorporated Association) et aI., Petitioners, Y.
SUPERIOR COURT OF 'fRINITY COUNTY, Respondent; CORNELIUS A. HOOD et al., Real Parties ill
Interest.
[1] Prohibition-Petition.-A petition by labor nnions and organ-

izers for writ of prohibition to restrain the superior court from
further proceedings in an action brought against them by
employers who operated lL retail market to enjoin them froll1
interfering with the employers' business did 110t by alleging
as bare conclusions of law that the court had no jurisdiction
of the subject matter of the action but that exclusive jurisdiction was with federal judicial and administrative agencies,
notwithstanding a similar avennent in the plaintiffs' answer to
petitioners' cross-complaint therein, establish any facts as to
the effect of any alleged labor practice on interstate commerce within the meaning of the federal Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, as amended (the Taft-Hartley Act,
29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.), but rather thel·e was an unresolved
"factual question" (in addition to questions of law) on which
determination of the superior court's jurisdiction might eventually depend, but no such issue was ripe for resolution in the
prohibition proceeding.
[2] Labor-Labor Legislation-"Right-to-Work" Ordinance-Validity.-Whel·e a county "right-to-work" ordinance relied on
in an injunction suit by employers of a _retail market to
restrain labor unions and organizers from interfering with
plaintiffs' business by picketing to compel plaintiffs to execute
collective bargaining agreements with the demanding unions
contravened the statewide statutory policy as to the freedom
of employes to organize, select representatives and through
them bargain collectively for the traditional objectives of
organized labor, subject only to such regulations and proscriptions as are set forth in the statutes or otherwise imposed by
law (Lab. Code, §§ 920-923, 1115-1122, 1126), where the ordinance partially duplicated statewide statutory pOlicy insofar
as it prohibited jurisdiction-organizational nSiI:lUlts on estahlished employe-employer relationships, and where its conflict
with general law could not be eliminated by mechanical separation of its language, the injunction suit could 110t continue
insofar as it sought relief nnder the ordinance.
-. ----_.- --- ----_._------------- .-- - -- [2J See Ca1.Jur.2d, Lahor, 10 ct seq.; Am.Jur., L~lhor, § 3 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Prohibition, § 54; [2J I,nbor, § 1.1i
[3] Labor, § 24; [4] Labor, § 25.
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[3] Id,-Remedies'-PIohibition." In ;. proce('ding jn l'l"-litil)lti"l1
by lahor unions and oJ'(;lInizl'rs 10 C'OIllPf'\ thl' slIpcri')r ('Illll'l
to desist f!"Om further proecedings in an action brought against
them by employers of a retail market to enjoin them from
interfering with the employers' business, where neither employers nor employes wanted a union shop agreement with or
melllbership in the denl!uulinci unions, where the unions sought
by the pressures of picketing' to induce the employers to compel
their employes to join such unwanted unions "and constitute
them their bargaining agents, where the unions by merely
alleging in the injullction suit thnt the superior court did not
have jUI'isdiction hut that such jurisdiction was in the federal
judicial and administrative agencies did not establish any facts
as to thc effect of any allegcd labor practice on interstate commerce, and where the unions also cross-colllplained in the
injunction suit alleging that the employers coerced their employes to prevent the exercise of their right to full freedom
of association and designation of 1't'presentatives of their own
choosing, thc injunction suit could continue both on the complaint and cross-complaint in respect to any relevant relief
which was not precluded by federal law and which was provided under state law as declared in Lab, Code, §§ 921-923,
1115-1122, 1126, and the writ of p~'ohibitinn should be denied.
[4:] Id.-Remedies-lnjunctive Relief.-A preliminary injunction
enjoining any picketing, boycott, strike or threats for the purpose of forcing and inducing plaintiff employers to make an
agreement requiring their employes to become or remuin members of any labor organization in order to obtain, l'etain or
continue in employment with plaintiffs was proper since it
enjoined conduct which was tortious under Lab. Code, §§ 921923, 1115-1122, 1126. A further portion of the preliminary injunction characterizing the enjoined conduet as violative of
an invalid county "right-to-work" ordinance was mere descriptive surplusage, utterly void in any application.

PROCEEDINGS in prohibition to compel the Superior
Court of Trinity County to desist from further proceedings in
an action, Writ denied.
Charles P. Scully, Victor Van Bourg and Halpin & Halpin
for Petitioners.
Stennett M. Sheppard, District Attorney, for Respondent,
Severson, Davis & Larson, Nathan R. Berke and George
Brunn for Bral Parties in Interest.
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SCHAUER, J.-Petitioners (labor unions and organizers)
seek a writ of prohibition (with mandatory as well as prohibitory effect) to compel respondent superior court of Trinity
County (1) to desist from further proceedings in an action
(hereinafter· sometimes referred to as the basic or superior
court action) brought against petitioners by the real parties in
interest (employers who operate a retail market), (2) to dissolve an "order for preliminary injunction and preliminary
injunction" entered in such basic action, and (3) to grant petitioners' "motions to dismiss and vacate any judgment, order
for preliminary injunction and preliminary injunction"
entered in that action.
The complaint in the subject basic action alleges that defendants (petitioners here) are interfering with plaintiffs'
business by picketing to compel plaintiffs to execute collective
bargaining agreements with the demanding unions; that the
unions are not authorized to represent, or to negotiate for, any
of plaintiffs' employes; but that the agreements contain a
provision that plaintiffs will require their employes to become
and remain members of the unauthorized unions (and thereby
choose and designate such unions as their bargaining representatives) as a condition of retaining their employment.
Plaintiffs in the basic action seek injunctive relief and ask
leave to amend to set forth damages when the amount of such
damages becomes ascertainable. The complaint alleges the
enactment of a county "right-to-work" ordinance which by
its terms became effective on the date of the filing of the
complaint. The provisions of the ordinance (No. 22S) are in
all material respects, including the definition of "labor organization" in section 1, identical with the provisions of the San
Benito County ordinance quoted and summarized in Chavez v.
Sargent, ante, p. 162 [339 P.2d SOl], footnote 1. The facts
in this case, however, are antithetical to those in Chavez.
There all three interested entities-employer, employes (the
majority of them), and the subject union-want to execute a
union shop agreement. Here, neither employers nor employes
want a contract with or membership in the demanding union~.
The unions, nevertheless, seek hy the pressures of picketing to
induce the employers to compel their employes to join such
unwanted unions and constitute them their bargaining agent,;.
Petitioners attack the validity of the ordinance on variolls
grounds; also they urgc that exclusive jurisdiction of this controversy is in the National Labor Relations Board and the
federal courts. We have concluded that the record does not
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establish that exclusive jurisdiction is in the federal board and
that the ordinance is invalid for the reasons explained
in .Chat'cz Y. Sargent, allie, p. 162 L339 P.2d 801]; but
that since the subject superior court action seeks relief which
conceivably can be afforded under the same state law which
renders the ordinance void, the proceedings therein can continue on both the complaint and the defendants' cross-complaint.
The preliminary injunction attacked by petitioners restrains them from ' 'picketing, boycott, strike, or threats' ,
for the purpose of inducing plaintiffs-employers to make an
agreement that they will require their employes to become
or remain members of any labor organization as a condition
of employment, in violation of Ordinance Number 228. In
support of this inj wIction the court found, among other
things, that "Most of the employees of plaintiffs are not members of the defendant labor organizations and the employees
of plaintiffs have not at any time demanded from plaintiffs
a union shop or union recognition, nor have such employees
participated at any time in the negotiations for collective bar·
gaining tJ{Jreements, nor have the employees of plaintiffs designated the defendants or any of them as the·ir representatifJes for collective bargaining." (Italics added.) All of the
italicized portion of the quoted finding is material but, as
explained in' the Chavez case, ante, p. 162 [339 P.2d 801]
that which is of paramount importance in bringing this case
within the control of the statutes which declare the overriding
state policy and which must govern disposition of this litigation (Lab. Code, §§ 920-923, 1115-1122, 1126, quoted in OhafJez
v. Sargent, ante, footnotes 6 through 8) is the fact that plaintiffs' employes have not chosen or designated petitioners as
their representatives.
The answer of petitioners (as defendants in the basic action)
alleges ., That the court has no jurisdiction of the subject
matter of this action . . . in this, that the exclusive jurisdiction thereof lies with the judicial and administrative
agencies of the United States." Petitioners also cross·complained, alleging that plaintiffs coerced their employes "to
prevent the exercise of their right to full freedom of as80ciation, self-organization and designation of representatives
of their own choosing." Plaintiffs' answer to the cross-complaint aUt'ges "that the Court has no jurisdiction of the
subjt'ct matter of the cross-complaint . . . in that the exclu-
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sivejurisuietioll thereof lies with the NatiOllal Labor Relations
Board."
Petitioners urge that by thc above quoted allegation of the
answer they have alleged, and by the above quoted averment
of the answcr to the cross-complaint plaiutiffs have admitted,
that the plaintiffs' business affects interstate commerce within the meaning of the federal Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947, as amended (the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 141 et seq.) ; that under the natioJlul act the state court ha~
no jurisdictioll to grant relief ou account of the conduct here
in question; and that therefore (as ill Calise v. Super'ior Court
(1958), 159 Cal.App.2d 126, 133, 135 [3] [323 P.2d 859])
prohibition should issue. [1] We are not prepared to hold
that the allegations of bare conclusions of law as to jurisdiction establish any facts as to the effect of any alleged labor
practice npon interstate commerce (see Braum v. Aguilar
(1927), 202 Cal. 143, 149 [259 P. 735); Kidwell v. Ketler
(1905), 146 Cal. 12, 17, 18 [79 P. 514] [pleader is not bound
byallegatioll or admission of conclusion of law) ; Faulkner v.
California Toll Bridge Authority (1953), 40 Cal.2d 317,
329 [9),330 (12) [253 P.2d 659] [conclusions of law are not
admitted by demurrer); Wheeler v. Oppenlleimer (1956),
140 Cal.App.2d 497, 501 [3) [295 P.2d 128) [conclusion of
law "tendered no issue") ; rather, we agree with the superior
court that in 'the present state of the record there is an unresolved "factual question" (in addition to questions of law)
upon which determination of its jurisdiction may eventually
depend. At the present time the allegations as to jurisdiction
show at most that upon further proceedings in the basic action
questions of federal preemption may be presented; but they
-show also that no such issue is ripe for resolution in this proceeding.
[2] Here, as in the Chavez case, ante, p. 162 [339 P.2d
801] the ordinance contravenes the state-wide statutory
policy as to the freedom of employes to organize, select representatives, and through them bargain collectively for the
traditional objectives of organized labor, suhje('t only to such
r£'glllations and proscription!> as arc set forth in the statute~
or otherwise imposed by law (Lab. Cod!', §§ 920 ..923, 11]51122, 1126; see by way of examples of "rf'guJations and proscriptions . . . otherwise impo~ed," the decisional law of
James v. Mar'itlship Corp. (1944), 25 Ca1.2d 721 [155 P.2d
329, 1GO A.L.R 900); H'ughes v. Sup!J1'wr Conrt (1948), 32
Cn1.211 BriO [198 P.2t1 88:>], nffi I' III p(l Jlughs v. Rllprl'iur

)
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Court (1950), 339 U,S. 460 [70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed, 985]);
likewise, the ordinance partially duplil.'ates state-wide statutory policy insofar as it prohibits jurisdiction-organizational
assaults on established employe-employer relatiol13hips; and
its conflict with general law cannot be eliminated by mechanical separation of its language. The basic superior court action, thcrefore, cannot continue insoiar as it seeks relief under
the ordinance.
[3] The subject action, however, can continue both 011 the
complaint and on the cross-complaint in· respect to any relevant relief which is not, on the facts, precluded by federal
law and which is provided under state law as declared in sections 921 through 923, sections 1115 through 1122, and section 1126 of the Labor Code. (Chavez y. Sargent, ante,
ll. 162 [339 r.2d 801].) If it develops that plaintiffs'
ImsineBs does 110t affcct interstate commerce within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, and
that defendants are picketing to compel plaintiffs (the employers) to violate state law by coercing their employes to
designate the defendants as their exclusive bargaining representatives, and to accept terms and conditions of employment
dictated by defendants, without authorization by plaintiffs'
employes, then plaintiffs may be entitled to both injunctive
relief and damages. If it deyelops that the subject dispute
interferes ,,"'ith the flow of interstate commerce (see the TaftHartley declaration of policy and purpose, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141),
then the alleged conduct of defendants, tortious but peaceful
within the federal concept, cannot be restrained or redressed
by the state. This conclusion follows because no facts are
alleged or found which tend to exclude plaintiffs from tIl\'
class segregated by the federal authorityl for nonaccess to
the courts. (San Diego Building Tmdes Council v. GaI'mon
(1959), 339 CS. 236 [79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775]; San
D·iego Bldg. Tmdcs Cou.ncil v. Ga;'moll (1957), 353 U.S. 26
l77 S.Ct. 607, 609, 1 L.Ed.2d 618].)
[4] The preliminary injunction enjoins "any picketing,
boycott, strike, or threat for the purpose of forcing and inducing plaintiffs to make I1n agreement requiring plaintiffs'
employees to become or remain members of . . . any . . .
labor orgalli7.ution, ill order to obtain, retain or continue in
-----,.. '.,. _. _.. _._._----- -------_._---_ .. ._-_.- - . - - -

_"

'Th" Natioual I.abor Relations Board, according to Ib present sell'·
iwpoKed limitation of jurisdiction, will not net in caKes of alleged unfuh·
lahor practit~ell where the employer is a retailer with a gross annual husi·
ness of less than :1';;00,000.
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employment with plaintiffs which in any way is in violatum
0/ Ordinance No. 228 0/ the County 0/ Trinity, which bccam,~
c/lecti·vc on September 18, 1957." (Italics added.) The UIlitalicized portion of the preliminary injunction is proper, for
it enjoins conduct which under the circumstances found is
tortious under the above referred to sections of the Labor
Code and which has not been shown to affect interstate COlUmerce so as to bring it within the purview of the national
act. The emphasized portion of the preliminary injunction,
characterizing the enjoined conduct as violative of the invalid
ordinance, is mere descriptive surplusage, utterly void in any
application.
For the reasons above stated, the alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ is denied.
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I concur in the judgment and opinion, for
the reasons expressed in my concurring opinion in Chavez v.
Sa1'gent, ante, p. 162 [339 P.2d 801].
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in
the judgment insofar as it determines that the Trinity County
ordinance is invalid. It is my opinion, however, that the 1inding relied upon by the majority opinion does not establish
that petitioners' objective was unlawful under state law and
that the preliminary injunction is therefore without support
in the record.
Petitioners, certain unions and their officers seeking to
organize plaintiffs' Super Market employees, commenced
picketing the market to induce plaintiffs to execute union shop
agreements. Plaintiffs' employees had not selected the unions
as their bargaining agents, and it does not appear that they
wish to be organized or to work under a union shop agreement. The majority opinion holds that picketing or other concerted activities by the unions to secure union shop agreements is therefore unlawful under state law. In the companion
case of Chavez v. Sargent, ante, p. 162 [339 P.2d 801], the
majority opinion holds that a union or closed shop agreement
is lawful if a majority of the employees wish it and that in
such a case picketing or other peaceful concerted activity to
secure a union or closed shop is likewise lawful.
This is new law ill this state. The majority opiJliolls purport
to find it in sections 920-923,1115-1120, 1122, and 1126 of the
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Labor Code. Since sections 920-923 had been interpreted to
permit condnct now found to be proscribed, the majority
.opinions invoke the later-enacted Jurisdictional Strike Act
(Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1120) and Labor Code, section 1122, to
support their conclusion that organizational activity carried
on without the support of or against the wishes of a majority
of the employees involved is unlawful. The Jurisdictional
Strike Act, however, deals only with disputes between two or
more labor organizations, and accordingly, to make its provisions relevant to a dispute between organized and unorganized
labor, the majority opinions are driven to create a fictitious
labor organization consisting of the unorganized employees
and then pitting that unorganized "organization" against the
unions.
The Jurisdictional Strike Act says nothing whatever about
the llew test of legality now adopted. To avoid the prohibition
of organizational activities by a majority of the employees
against a dissident unorganized minority under the new construction of that act the majority opinions judicially amend
it to permit jurisdictional strikes carried on by unions representing a majority of the employees involved. Such amendment is a flagrant usurpation of legislative power.
Furthermore, neither section 1122 nor 1126 supports the
new rules created by the majority opinions. Section 1122, like
section 923, proscribes employer interference with labor organizations. Far from indicating a legislative repudiation of the
settled judicial interpretation of section 923 when section 1122
was enacted, it constitutes a legislative adoption of that interpretation. Section 1126 merely provides for the enforcement
of collective bargaining agreements. It is silent as to the
validity of closed or union shop provisions in such agreements
or the legality of concerted activity undertaken to secure
them.
Before the decision of this court in Garmon v. San Diego
Bldg. Trades Oouncil, 49 Cal.2d 595 [320 P.2d 47~J, it was settled that a closed or union shop is a proper objective of COllcerted labor activity, since it is reasonably related to union
welfare and the betterment of working conditions whether or
not any or a majority of the employees belong to the union
or wish to bargain collectively. (.T. F. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Oouncil, 154 Cal. 581 [98 P. 1027, ]6 Ann.Cas.
1165,21 L.R.A. N.S. 550] : McKay v. Relail Auto. S. L. U'llion
No. 1()67, 16 Ca1.2d 311, 315-325 [l06 P.2tl 3731 ; C. S. Smith
Met. Market Co. v. Lyons, 16 Ca1.2d 389, 401 [106 P.2d 414] ;
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Jlagill Bros. v. Building Service etc. Union, 20 Ca1.2d 506,
508 [127 P.2d 542] ; James v. Marillship Corp., 25 Ca1.2d 721,
730 [155 r.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900]; Park &- T. I. Corp. v.
Internati01/al etc. of Teamsters, 27 Ca1.2d 599, 604 [165 P.2d
891, 162 A.L.R. 1426] ; Oharles H. Benton, Inc. v. Painters
Local Union, 45 Ca1.2d 677, 681 [291 P.2d 13].) 'l'he r~aSOllS
for permitting picketing to compel a closed or union shop,
even when none of the employees belong to the picketing union,
were articulated in O. S. SmUh Met. Mat'ket Co. v. Lyons, 16
Ca1.2d 389, 401 [106 P.2d 414] : "The members of a labor
organization may have a substantial interest in tIle employment relations of an employer although none of them is or
ever has been employed by him. The reason for this is that
the employment relations of every employer affect the working
couditions and bargaining power of employees throughout the
industry in which he competes. Hence, where union and nonunion employees are engaged in a 3itni1ar oeeupation and theil'
respective employers are ell~aged in trade competition one
with another, thc efforts of the union to extend its membership
to the employments in which it has no foothold is not an unreasonable aim." (See also Sl!hauer, J. dissenting ill Bautista
v. Jones, 25 Cal.2d 746, 767, 783 [155 P.2d 343].)
In the Garmon case, by reinterpreting section 923 of the
Labor Code and invoking the Jurisdictional Strike Act, the
court held that a union shop contract is an unlawful objective
under state law when nOlle of the employees wish to join or be
represented by the union. The court concluded that by signiug'
a union shop agreement the employer would iuterfel'e with hi~
employees' rights" in the designation of . . . representatives
or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or proteetion" (Lab. Code, § 923) in violation of section 923. As I
pointed out in my dissent ill the Garmon case, the court in
effect overruled a settled rule of decision to the contrary and
in particular Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, 16 Cal. ,
2d 379, 383-388 [106 P.2d 403], which expressry held that
sections 920-923 of the IJahor Code do not restrid the right of '
labor to engage ill eOIlf'ertl'c1 Ilrtivity to attain a ('losen or
union shop.
The Garmon (·It''C dpa1t with 11 business that afft'f'tl'd inter::;tatc commer,"e and was rcvCl'sell Oil tIle qne:;tiol1 of federal
precmption in San Diego Rlli111'llgl'rades OOlweil v. am'mOIl,
~ij9 U.S. 2:36 [79 S.Ct. 77:1. 3 rd~11.2tl 77ri}. ;\for·C'()wl'. it wa~
decided on all erroneous assnmption that the conclud found
1
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tortious under state law was also illegal under federal law. As
. t.he United States Supreme Court pointed out, however, it was
. by no means clear that the conduct involved violated federal
law. ·In fact, it may have been protected by that law. (See
Labor Management Relations Act, §§ 7,8 (b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157,
158 (b).) If, despite these weaknesses in this court's Garmon
decision, the majority opinions in the present cases adhered to
it on the question of the illegality of union or closed shop contracts and concerted activity to achieve them under state law,
it would be necessary to determine if that case controls the
present ones. In my opinion, however, there is no basis \vhatsoever in the statutory law of this state for distinguishing between a closed or union shop agreement sought by a union representing a majority of the employees and such an agreement
sought by a union representing none or only a minority of the
employees. By agreeing to hire only union members or to
require new employees to join the union, the employer in either
case assists the union in controlling the labor market and
thereby enables it to recruit and retain members. It makes
no difference to the nonunion employee who wishes to remain
unorganized whether he is compelled to accede to the wishes of
a majority of his fellow employees in the same shop or to the
pressure of a union seeking to organize a shop in which it has
not yet gained a foothold. If the employer accedes to the
demand for a closed or union shop in either case, he interferes
with the right of unorganized employees to remain unorganized. Such interference was not proscribed before the Garmon
case, for it was merely incidental to the union's pursuit of a
proper objective. Section 923 does not provide that a closed or
union shop is a lawful objective when the union has a majority
but an unlawful objective when it does not. It does not make
the legality of concerted union activity turn on the extent of
the success the union has already achieved in the particular
shop it seeks to organize. Accordingly, if, as the Garmon cnSl'
held, it is unlawful employer interference to make a union
or closed shop agreement with a union that does not represeut
a majority of the employees, it is also such interference to make
such an agreement with a union that does. By distinguishing
between these two situations the majority opinions in the
present ea"es at least in part repndiate the Garmon decision,
antI it is signifieant that they now point out that "our conclusions in the present case . . . al'e independent of, and do not
rest on, onr second Garmon decision, supra, 49 Ca1.2d 595."
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(Chavez v. Sargent, ante, Pl'. 162, 211 [339 P.2d 801].)
For these reasons the Garmon case does not control the present
eases.
. The majority opinions hold that a closed or union shop agreement and concerted activity to achieve it are lawful, but only
if a majority of the employees to be covered by the agreement
wish it. Such a limitation is admittedly contrary to the law
as it was understood before the enactment of the Jurisdictional
Strike Act in 1947. Moreover, it finds no support whatever
in that act as a reading of its provisions makes abundantly
clear. In Seven Up etc. Co. v. Grocery etc. Union, 40 Ca1.2d
368, 381 [254 P.2d 544, 33 A.L.R.2d 327], we sustained the
constitutionality of the act and summarized its effect as follows: "Wisely or unwisely the Legislature has declared the
policy of this state that an employer's business shall not be
interfered with or the public welfare disrupted by reason of an
argument between two or more unions as to which shall be
chosen to represent his employees. . . . The act eliminates the
situation where the labor organization is employer controlled,
hence an independent union is not prevented from endeavoring
to organize an employer's employecs when they belong to an
employer controlled union or flO union." (Italics added.) We
are now told, however, that organizational pressure is "essentially a jurisdictional dispute pressure," and that" any group
of employes, organized or unorganized in the formal, conventional sense, who were free of the proscribed employer influence and who determined and informed their employer through
their authorized spokesman that they were unwilling to accede
to the demands of an organizer or unwanted union, and that
they were satisfied with the terms and conditions of their employment and wished to continue in the established employeemployer relationship, would thereby act as and constitute a
'labor organization' within the meaning of sections 1117 and
1118. " (Oha.vcz v. Sargent, ante, pp. 162, 20~ [339 P .2d i
801].)
,
To constitute a labor organization, sections 1117 and 1118
of the Labor Code require more than an agreement not to be
organized. Such an organization must exist for the purpose
"of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours of employment or conditions of work."
(Lab. Code, § 1117.) A group whose sole purpose is to express the wish of its members not to deal as a group with the
employer" concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours
of employment or conditions of work" is obviously not an
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organization that exists for the purposf'S stated in section
1117. It is a contradiction in terms to hold that a group
,~bose purpose is not to bargain is nevertheless 8. bargaining
. ~gent. But even if such a group could be a labor organization
under section 1117, its objection to organization of the shop
could not give rise to a jurisdictional strike within the meaning of section 1118. Such a strike can only arise out of a
"controversy between two or more labor organizations as to
which of them has or should have the exclusive right to bargain collectively with an employer . . . [or] the exclusive
right to have its members perform work for an employer."
(Lab. Code, § 1118.) The wish of all or some of the employees
to work in an open shop without collective bargaining is the
very antithesis of a demand for the "exclusive right to bargain collectively" or for the "exclusiye right to have [their]
members perform work for [the] employer."
Even if a dispute with the fictitious organization created
by the majority opinion in the Chavez case could give rise
to a jurisdictional strike, there is no such dispute here. The
trial court did not find that the employees had an "authorized
spokesman" who' informed the employer "that they were
unwilling to accede to the demands of an organizer or unwanted union, and that they were satisfied with the terms and
conditions of their employment and wished to continue in
the established employe-employer relationship." (Ohavez v.
Sal·gent, ante, pp. 162, 203 [339 P.2d 801].) It found only
that "Most of the employees of plaintiffs are not members
of the defendant labor organization and the employees of
plaintiffs have not at any time demanded from plaintiffs a
union shop or union recognition, nor have such employees
participated at any time in the negotiations for collective
bargaining agreements, nor have the employees of plaintiffs
designated the defendants or any of them as their representatives for collective bargaining." At most this finding simply
shows that the employees were indifferent to tRe unions' efforts. It does not even suggest a common wish to retain the
status quo. The burden of establishing the existence of a labor
organization within the meaning of the Jurisdictional Strike
Act is on the plaintiff seeking relief pursuant to its terms.
(Lab. Code, § 1117.) It is obvious that plaintiffs did not
meet this burden. They did not even attempt to do so, for
the novel theory that the Jurisdictional Strike Act might be
appli!·able to a dispute between a union and unorganized em-
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ployeel> was yet to be suggested for the first time in the Garmon case.
The logic of the majority opinions' invocation of the Jurisdictional Strike .<\.ct would carry thcm far beyond where they
profess willingness to go. The existence of an organization
docs not depend on the number of its members so long as there
are more than one. Thus, if a majority of the employees ill
a shop are a labor organization because they wish to remahl
unorganized, so must be a minority that wish to remain unorganized. Any dispute between a union and the unorganized
employees would result in a jurisdictional strike if the union
engaged in concerted activity to advance its position. (Lab.
Code, § 1118.) Dnder thc reasoning of the majority opinions
as few as two employees who did not wish to Le organized
would constitute a labor organization. If the terms or the act
are to be thus distorted to make the unorganized organized,
no concerted activity for collective bargaiuing is lawful unless the employees involved achieve substantial uuallimity.
As the majority opinions tacitly concede, no such absurd
result was contemplated by the Legislature, and to avoid it,
the majority opinions are driven to limit the application or
the act to cases where the organizational activity is carried
on by a union that does not represent a majority of the employees involved. The Jurisdictional Strike Act, however,
does not provide for majority rule; majority rule is the
creation of the majority opinions. By its terms the act protects the employer from jurisdictional strife between labor
organizations without regard to where the preference of a majority of his employees may lie. He is entitled to relief if
he proves that a jurisdictional strike exists. He need not
prove that the union engaged in the proscribed activity docs
not represent a majority. As now amended the act affords
him much less protection, and it may come as a shock to employers who assumed that they were protected from true
jurisdictional concerted activities conducted by powerful COlltending unions to learn that relief may be secured only: against
the union found to represent a minority or none or'the employees.
The majority opinions' reliance on srdion 1122 of the
J1abor Code is eqnally illogieal. 'l'hat sectiotl Jll'ovides that
"AllY person who organizes nn employee gronp which is
financed in whole or in part, interfered with or dominated or
('olltrolled by the employer or any employer assoeiation, as
well as Sl1rh employer or employt'r association, 811a11 he 1iahle
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to suit by any person who is injured thereby. Said injured
party shall recover the damages sustained by him and the costs
of suit. " Weare told that" The proscription in this language
extends not alone to the act of organizing an employee group
financed by an employer but also to organizing any group of
employes wherein the act of organizing such group, i.e., obtaining the consent of the employes to join ill the organization,
is either 'interfered with or dominated or controlled by the
employer.' . . . For an employer to notify his employt's that
he has agreed with a union which is, and which he knows to
be, unauthorized and unwanted by his employes, that they
must join such union and be represented by it or be dismissed
from employment would appear to constitute an unlawful
interference by the employer and subject him to the liability
imposed by seetion 1122."
(Chavez v. Sargent, ante, pp.
162, 205 [339 P.2d 801].)
Section 1122 was added to the Labor Code ill 1955 by the
. same act that amended section 1117 to put the burden on the
plaintiff of establishing the existenee of a labor organization.
(Stats. 1955, ch. 1417, §§ 1-2.) Its obvious purpose is to prevent abuse of the Jurisdictional Strike Act by discouraging
employers from organizing company union.'I to create the appearance of jurisdictional strikes when none in fact exist. It
prohibits, not the execution of union or Closcd shop agreements with independent union.'1, but the organizing of an
employer-interfered-with group. Moreover, if it did constitute
employer interference within the meaning of section 1122 to
execute a closed or union shop agreement with a union that
does not represent a majority of the employees, it ,vould likewise constitute such interference to execute such an agreement
with a union representing a majority of them. Here, as in the
case of the Jurisdictional Strike Act, however, the majority
opinions shrink from the logic of their position and read into
section 1122 language that is not there to permit what in their
view would be employer interferenre but for the ;ish of a
majority of the employees to have a closed or uniou shop agreement. Before the decision in the Garmon case it was settled
that the proscription of employer interference in section 923
of the Labor Code did not outla,v dosed or nnion SllOP agreements even though the employees did not wish them. Not only
must the similar inhibitions of se(~tion ] 122 be interpreted in
accord with the established interpretation or sl'dion 923 at the
time section 1122 was enacted, but the f/lilure of the IJegisla-
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ture to amend section 923 when it enacted both the Jurisdictional Strike Act and section 1122 affords cogent evidence that
. it approved the existing interpretation of section 923. (See
. ['coplc v. Nash, ante, pp. 36, 46-47 [338 P.2d 416]; Colc
v. Ru.sh, 45 Ca1.2d 345, 355 [289 P.2d 450, 54 A.L.R.2d 1137] ;
Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Ca1.2d 183, 200 [288 P.2d 12, 289
P.2d 242].)
Thus, neither the Jurisdictional Strike Act nor section 1122
of the Labor Code supports a reinterpretation of section 923
to restrict the right of workmen to engage in concerted organizational activity. Before the Garmon decision such activities
were fully protected as part of the individual ,vorkman's "full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of his own choosing." (Lab. Code, § 923.) Of
course the right of a union effectively to compete for employment on satisfactory terms for its members by seeking a closed
or union shop interferes with the right of nonunion workmen
to go it alone. Its recognition is not at war, however, as the
majority opinions suggest, with either union democracy or
majority rule unless the relevant majority is determined with
myopic vision. A union that seeks control of available employment cannot arbitrarily close its ranks to qualified workmen
or deny them full participation in its councils (James v.
Marinship Corp., 25 Ca1.2d 721, 730-734 [155 P.2d 329, 160
A.L.R. 900]; Thorman v. International Alliance etc. Employees,49 Ca1.2d 629,632 [320 P.2d 494]), and accordingly,
democratic representation must be afforded to those the union
claims the right to represent. Moreover, by approving the
legality of a closed or union shop when a majority of the
workmen directly involved wish it, the majority opinions
recognize that the right to remain unorganized is subject to
legitimate group interests and pressures. By looking only to
the workmen immediately involved, however, the majority
opinions blind themselves to the essential interrelation of
working conditions in competitive businesses and choose as thc
relevant group whose majority may govern, not all of the workmen with interests in common, but only a small fraction of
them. It is true that we have no mechanism for determining
whether a majority of all workmen with common interests do
or do not wish collective bargaining through unions in which
they may freely participate,' but if each workman the union
seeks to represent is protected in his right to parti<,ipate in
union affairs, the danger of a minority thrusting itself 011 an
unwilling majority in the labor market would be remote.
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Moreover, the "outcome of concerted acth·it.ies for a rIosed
. shop depends largely on public sentiment. No eompetitive
. business can endure indefinitely without good will; no group
.of workers cau long define the terms of its employment without i
public support." (Pa7'k & T. I. Corp. v. I nternatiollaZ etc. of
Teamste1'S, 27 Ca1.2d 599, 608 [165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R.
1426].)
One searches the California statutes relied upou by the
majority opinions in vain for a hint of the new law of labormanagement relations set forth today. Either the proscriptions ,
of employer interference in sections 923 and 1122 preclude .
(·losed or union shop contracts or they do not. Neither section
affords any support for the conclusion that they are sometimes
lawful and sometimes not, depending on the wishes of a majority of the employees directly involved. The requirement of
majority rule haS been lifted from section 8 (a) (3) (i) of the
federal Labor Management Relations Act. (29 U.S. C., §§ 158,
159.) Such borrowing is obviously a legislative function.
Moreover, the administrative machinery that is not only basic
to the operation of the federal act but necessary to make SE-Ction 8 (a) (3) (i) effective and workable is not so easily come
by. The majority opinion in the Chavez case suggests that employers and Unions may cooperate in conducting free elections,
and so I suppose they may. But who is to determine the appropriate bargaining unit or conduct an election when the
parties disagree or refuse to cooperateT (See §§ 8(a) (3) (i);
9 (b); 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 159.) These difficulties, of course,
only emphasize the impropriety of usurping the legislative
function. If we are to have a little Labor Management Relations Act, it is for the Legislatnre, not this court to enact it.
I am cOllvinced that union or closed shop agreements and
concerted activities to achieve them are lawful under the law
of this state whether or not a majority of the employees wish
them. The majority opinions do not state that any of the cases
so holding were wrongly decided, but apparelltly convinced I
that the time is now ripe for striking a new balance between '
the rights of organized and unorganized labor and employers,
they Reize upon the Jurisdictional Strike Act to achieve an
objective foreign to its purpose, By enacting the Jurisdietional
Strike Act the Legislature did not change or modify the policy
set forth in section 923 insofar as purely organizational union
activity is concerned, Only by amending that act by judicial
fiat to provide for "majority rule" and applying it when it is
obviously inapposite do the majority opinions achieve their
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aims. The conclusion is inescapable t.hat in both method and
result they have usurped legislative power.
Gibson, C. J., concurred.
Petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied June,
18, 1959. Peters, J., did not participate therein. Gibson,
C. J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.
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